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Abstract 
Cross-province growth regressions for China are estimated for the reform period. Two 
research questions are asked. Can the regressions help us to understand why China as a whole 
has grown so fast? What types of investment matter for China’s growth? We address the 
problem of model uncertainty by adopting two approaches to model selection to consider a 
wide range of candidate predictors of growth. Starting from the baseline equation, the growth 
impact of physical and human capital is examined using panel data techniques. Both forms of 
capital promote economic growth. 'Investment in innovation' and private investment are 
found to be particularly important. Secondary school enrolment contributes to growth, and 
higher education enrolment even more so. 
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‘For the period 1960-1980 we observe, for example, India 1.4% a year,…, South Korea 
7.0%,…An Indian will on average be twice as well off as his grandfather; a Korean 50 
times…The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply 
staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is difficult to think of anything else.’ 
(Lucas, 2002: 20-1). 
 
1. Introduction 
Since economic reform commenced in 1978, the Chinese economy has experienced 
remarkable economic growth. The growth rate of GDP per capita has averaged 8.6% per 
annum over the thirty-year period 1978-2007. Nor is there any sign of deceleration in growth: 
over the years 2000-07, the equivalent figure was 9.2%, and China accounted for about 35% 
of the growth in world GDP at PPP prices
1
. For a major country – China accounts for more 
than one-fifth of world population – such rapid progress is unprecedented. It is all the more 
remarkable in the light of China’s poverty – over 300 million people have been lifted out of 
one-dollar-a-day poverty since 1978
2
 – and of its difficult transition from being a centrally 
planned, closed economy at the start of reform towards becoming a market economy. 
This paper is a natural follow-up to our study utilising cross-country data to explore the 
reasons for China’s growth success compared with other countries in the world (Ding and 
Knight, 2009). In this paper we rely on a cross-province dataset spanning three decades to 
explain why China as a whole, and indeed all its provinces, has grown so fast. Our 
justification for this approach is at least twofold.  
Firstly, from the economic perspective, all of China’s provinces have grown rapidly. 
Even though each province would correspond to a country in most other parts of the world, 
they have certain characteristics in common. Can we learn why China as a whole has grown 
so fast by comparing the performance of its provinces? They share several features. All 
provinces are part of the ‘development state’ in which, since 1978, rapid economic growth 
has received primacy at all levels of government. However, some provinces reformed and 
marketised earlier and further than others. They are all subject to central government policies 
with regard to foreign trade, family planning, macroeconomic management, financial 
policies, etc. Nevertheless, there are province differences in openness to foreign trade, natural 
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 Based on new statistical calculations of PPP exchange rates published in December 2007 by the International 
Comparison Program (ICP), the World Bank and IMF recently revised downward their estimates for China's 
PPP-based GDP by around 40%. Despite this revision, China remains the main driver of global growth. For 
example, it contributed nearly 27% of world GDP growth in 2007 using the new PPP figure. 
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 The figure is calculated from Ravallion and Chen (2007).  
increase in population, level of economic activity, and the investment-output ratio. Even if 
China’s high growth is mainly due to the high average rate of investment in physical and 
human capital, it is still informative to use province differences in investment to investigate, 
for instance, what the effect on China’s growth rate would be if it had the much lower 
investment rate typical of other poor countries.  
Nevertheless, a qualification is in order. It is a common practice in the growth literature 
on China to extrapolate results from cross-province regressions to the economy as a whole 
(see, for instance, Guariglia and Poncet, 2006; Hao, 2006; and Yao, 2006). However, a 
national policy to increase a growth determinant might be more synchronised across 
provinces than is the case in our data set. Even in an economy as large as China’s and in one 
with a spatially segmented capital market (Allen et al., 2005; Guariglia et al., 2009), there is 
greater mobility of goods and factors across province borders than across the national border. 
An economy-wide increase in a growth determinant could therefore have effects different 
from those of the same proportionate increase confined to one province alone. For instance, 
additional physical investment at national level might be more subject to diminishing returns, 
or might raise aggregate demand sufficiently to induce growth-retarding policy responses. 
Caution is therefore required in applying estimates of the growth impact of a variable at the 
province level to the national level. 
Secondly, from the statistical perspective, the reliability of China’s macroeconomic 
data poses a significant challenge to empirical researchers in this field. We have adopted 
various measures to mitigate potential mismeasurement problems (see Section 4 for detail). 
In terms of data selection, we favour provincial over national data for the following reasons. 
First, in 2006, China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) undertook a benchmark revision 
of national income and product accounts statistics based on the 2004 economic census. This 
revision validates the pre-economic census provincial aggregate output values and invalidates 
the corresponding national figures (Holz, 2008). Second, the analysis of provincial time 
series data will reveal more information about the various determinants of economic growth 
than would an aggregate time series analysis. The use of provincial data expands our sample 
size substantially.    
Economists are better able to analyse the direct than the indirect determinants of 
growth, and yet these conventional variables may simply represent associations that are 
themselves to be explained by causal processes. There are three possible empirical 
approaches: growth accounting, structural growth modelling, and informal growth regression. 
Each has its strengths and weaknesses; each deserves to be explored. In contrast to the former 
two, the third approach permits the introduction of some explanatory variables that represent 
the underlying as well as the proximate causes of economic growth. That is well suited to our 
purposes and therefore used in our research.  
A feature of our study is to use recently developed approaches to model selection in 
order to construct empirical models based on robust predictors. There are many growth 
theories and few grounds on which to choose among them. The issue of model uncertainty 
has attracted much research attention in the context of cross-country growth regressions. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, it has been largely ignored in cross-province growth 
studies of China, i.e. the existing literature has not explicitly or systematically considered the 
issue of model selection before any investigation of particular causes of China's growth. We 
first use two leading model selection and model averaging approaches, Bayesian Model 
Averaging and the automated General-to-Specific approach, to examine the association 
between the growth rate of real GDP per capita and a large range of potential explanatory 
variables. These include the initial level of income, fixed capital formation, human capital 
formation, population growth, the degree of openness, institutional change, sectoral change, 
financial development, infrastructure and regional advantage. The variables flagged as being 
important by these procedures are then used in formulating our baseline model, which is 
estimated using panel data system GMM to address the problems of omitted variables, 
endogeneity and measurement error of regressors. In the second stage, the robustness of the 
selected models and the contribution of main variables are examined in detail. In this paper, 
our focus is on the growth impact of various types of physical and human capital investment. 
And the key question we ask is: which types matter? The contribution of other underlying 
variables such as the degree of openness, institutional change and structural change is 
analyzed in a companion paper (Ding and Knight, 2008b). Finally, some counterfactual 
predictions are conducted to answer the underlying question: can the cross-province growth 
regressions help us to understand why China as a whole has grown so fast?    
In Section 2 we provide the background to Chinese economic growth, as an aid to 
interpretation. Section 3 explains and justifies our empirical methodology. Having discussed 
the dataset, section 4 reports the empirical results: the baseline equation, the physical capital 
variables and the human capital variables. Section 5 briefly analyzes the factors that have 
permitted the rapid capital accumulation in China. Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
2. Background to China’s growth  
The growth of the Chinese economy since the start of its economic reform has been a process 
of ‘crossing the river by groping for the stepping stones’, as described by Deng Xiaoping: no 
stereotype reform package was adopted in advance. One reform begat the need, or the 
opportunity, for another, and the process became cumulative. The reforms were incremental 
but hardly slow: huge changes have occurred in less than three decades, as China has moved 
from central planning towards a market economy. It was relevant that China had been a 
labour surplus economy par excellence: labour was underemployed in the farms and in the 
urban state enterprises: government preferred unemployment to be disguised and shared 
rather than open and threatening (Knight and Song, 2005, chs. 2, 6, and 8). New sectors could 
thus be expanded without loss of output elsewhere. 
The first stage of economic reform (1978-84) concentrated on the rural areas. The 
communes were disbanded and individual incentives were restored. Farming households 
(then 82% of the population) were given use-rights to collectively-owned land under long 
term leases, and the right to sell their marginal produce on the open market. Rural non-farm 
enterprises were permitted, and they stepped in to produce the light manufactures that the 
urban state-owned enterprises (SOEs) generally failed to supply. Rural credit constraints 
encouraged household saving. Rural production rose rapidly as farms became more efficient, 
as surplus labour was used more productively in rural industry, and as rural entrepreneurship, 
saving and investment responded to the new opportunities. 
The second stage of economic reform (1985-92) was an incremental process of 
reforming the urban economy, in particular the SOEs, which were gradually given greater 
managerial autonomy. The principal-agent problem inherent in state ownership limited the 
efficiency of SOEs but competition from other market participants – initially village and 
township enterprises and later domestic and foreign privately owned enterprises as well as 
from imports – grew steadily. 
The third stage of economic reform (1993- ) was ignited by Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern 
Tour’ to mobilise support for more radical reforms. The private sector – for the first time 
acknowledged and accepted – was invigorated. Moreover, administrative and regulatory 
reform of rural-urban migration, the banking system, the tax system, foreign trade, and 
foreign investment lifted various binding constraints on economic growth. For instance, when 
the delayed effects of the ‘one-child family policy’ slowed down the growth of the urban-
born labour force from the mid-1990s onwards, the relaxation of restrictions on temporary 
rural-urban migration permitted continued rapid growth of the urban economy. 
Figure 1, reflecting China’s rapid growth of GDP per capita since 1978, shows a 
cyclical pattern of growth, more marked in the first and second stages of reform than in the 
third stage. Two peaks are evident, in 1984-5 and 1992-3, respectively reflecting the outcome 
of agricultural reforms and the green light given to capitalism. The growth rate troughed in 
1989-90 owing to the effect on investor confidence of the social unrest and ensuing 
international ostracism, and the policy response to a previous surge in inflation. A further 
examination of provincial growth trends shows that the growth rates of all provinces dropped 
dramatically in the late 1980s, indicating the general detrimental influence of such adverse 
shocks on economic growth.   
In summary, the reforms created market institutions and incentives that had been 
lacking in the socialist planned economy. They improved both static allocative efficiency and 
dynamic factor accumulation. Growth was also facilitated by the absorption of the abundant 
resource, labour, into the expanding, more productive activities. There was drastic movement 
towards the economy’s production frontier and dramatic movement of the frontier. It is 
plausible that together they were responsible for China’s remarkably high rate of growth. 
This is the general hypothesis that we wish to explore. 
3. Methodology 
We draw on the relevant literatures to explain and justify our methodology. This concerns the 
choice of informal growth regressions, the method of dealing with model uncertainty and the 
panel data estimation approach. 
Why informal growth regressions? 
The starting point in this research is our cross-country analysis of the extent to which the 
growth difference between China and other countries can be explained by the neoclassical 
growth model (Ding and Knight, 2009). We found that the Solow model augmented by both 
human capital and structural change provides a fairly good account of China's remarkable 
growth performance. Moreover, five factors - conditional convergence from a low income 
level, high physical capital formation, high level of human capital, rapid structural change 
away from agriculture, and slow population growth - made the main contributions to China's 
relative growth success. By providing these pointers, this cross-country analysis sets the 
scene for the current cross-province analysis. 
There is a large literature on cross-province growth regressions for China. Two 
empirical approaches have been used: some version of the neoclassical growth model, often 
in the form of the augmented Solow model as developed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) 
(MRW), or informal growth regressions (for instance, Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004), that contain among others the explanatory variables in which the researcher is most 
interested. Different periods are analysed, although most are confined to the period of 
economic reform, from 1978 onwards. The methods of analysis vary in sophistication, from 
cross-section OLS to panel data GMM analysis. The research covers a broad range of factors 
relating to variation in growth among Chinese provinces, such as convergence or divergence, 
physical and human capital investment, openness, economic reform, geographical location, 
infrastructure, financial development, labour market development, spatial dependence and 
preferential policies (see, for example, Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Li et al., 1998; Raiser, 1998; 
Chen and Feng, 2000; Démurger, 2001; Zhang, 2001; Bao et al., 2002; Brun et al., 2002; Cai 
et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2003; Guariglia and Poncet, 2006; Hao, 2006; Yao, 2006; and 
Fleisher et al., 2009). An underlying problem in all the research is the difficulty in 
establishing causal relationships as opposed to mere associations. 
 These studies often use an assortment of economic theories to motivate a variety of 
variables that are included in the cross-province or cross-city growth regressions, and then 
test the robustness of their conclusions to the addition of an ad hoc selection of further 
controls. Although each study presents intuitively appealing results, none has directly posed 
the general question: can the variations among provinces highlighted by cross-province 
growth regressions explain why the economy as a whole has grown so fast? Moreover, no 
systematic consideration has been given to uncertainty about the regression specification, 
with the implication that conventional methods for inference can be misleading.  
Another strand of growth research on China adopts the growth accounting approach to 
break down the observed growth of GDP into components associated with changes in factor 
inputs and in production technologies (see, for instance, Borenzstein and Ostry, 1996; Hu and 
Khan, 1997; Woo, 1998; Wang and Yao, 2001; Young, 2003; and Brandt et al., 2008). 
Average annual total factor productivity (TFP) growth in China for the reform period is found 
to range from a high of 3.9% to a low of 1.5% in these studies. This disconcertingly wide 
variation is partly the result of the different assumptions made. The growth accounting 
approach involves measuring the capital stock and making assumptions about unknown 
parameters such as output elasticities and capital depreciation rates. Two further arguments 
make us disinclined to use growth accounting. First, when the TFP growth is measured as a 
residual, i.e. as the growth rate in GDP that cannot be accounted for by the growth of the 
observable inputs, it should not be equated with technological change as many researchers 
have done. Rather it is 'a measure of ignorance' (Abramovitz, 1986), covering many factors 
like structural change, improvement in allocative efficiency, economies of scale, and any 
misspecification of the production function. This is particularly true for China. According to 
Borenzstein and Ostry (1996), technological progress in China has been substantially lower 
than TFP growth, with the difference representing structural change and unmeasured input 
growth. Second, technological change and investment may not be separable in reality, i.e. 
changing technology requires investment, and investment inevitably involves technological 
change. This is consistent with the view of Scott (1989) that technological change and 
investment are part and parcel of the same thing and that separation is meaningless. For 
instance, Ding and Knight (2009) found that investment is a major carrier of structural 
change in China: structural transformation requires investment in new, normally high-
productivity activities. Employment growth in the high-productivity industrial and service 
sectors is determined by the rate of investment in those sectors, and the new job opportunities 
are largely taken by migrant workers from the low-productivity agricultural sector. 
Dealing with model uncertainty  
There is no single explicit theoretical framework to guide empirical work on economic 
growth. The neoclassical model (Solow, 1956) predicts that the long-run economic growth 
rate is determined by the rate of exogenous technological progress, and that adjustment to 
stable steady-state growth is achieved by endogenous changes in factor accumulation. It is 
silent on the determinants of technological progress. Endogenous growth theory (for instance, 
Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990) concentrates on technological progress and emphasizes the role 
of learning by doing, knowledge spillover, research and development, and education in 
driving economic growth. Because the theories are not mutually exclusive, the problem of 
model uncertainty concerning which variables should be included to capture the underlying 
data generating process presents a central difficulty for empirical growth analysis. This issue 
has gained increasing attention following the seminal work of Levine and Renelt (1992) 
which applied an Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) to cross-country growth regressions and 
investigated the robustness of a large number of variables that were found in the literature to 
be correlated with growth. This work is further extended by Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Temple 
(2000). Other econometric and statistical methods have been developed and applied to handle 
model uncertainty as well, among which Bayesian Model Averaging (Raftery, 1995; 
Fernández et al., 2001; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004) and General-to-Specific approach (Hendry 
and Krolzig, 2004; Hoover and Perez, 2004) are among the most influential
3
. In this paper we 
adopt Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) and General-to-Specific approach (GETS) to 
consider the association between GDP per capita growth rates and a wide range of potential 
explanatory variables. The purpose of the first-stage model selection is to provide guidance 
on the choice of variables to include in the subsequent panel data analysis. 
The basic idea of BMA is that the posterior distribution of any parameter of interest is a 
weighted average of the posterior distributions of that parameter under each of the models 
with weights given by the posterior model probabilities. Thus a natural way to think about 
model uncertainty is to admit that we do not know which model is 'true' and, instead, attach 
probabilities to different possible models. By treating parameters and models as random 
variables, the uncertainty about the model is summarized in terms of a probability distribution 
over the space of all possible models. The idea of the GETS procedure is to specify a general 
unrestricted model (GUM), which is assumed to characterize the essential data generating 
process, and then to 'test down' to a parsimonious encompassing and congruent representation 
based on the theory of reduction. The specific regression is a valid restriction of the general 
model if it is statistically well specified and also encompasses every other parsimonious 
regression. One attractive feature of the automatic procedure of model selection is argued to 
be the huge efficiency gain.  
Each of the two procedures has comparative advantages and disadvantages in dealing 
with model uncertainty. For example, one key disadvantage of BMA is the difficulty of 
interpretation, i.e. parameters are assumed to have the same interpretation regardless of the 
model they appear in; in addition, it does not lead to a simple model, making the 
interpretation of results harder (Chatfield, 1995). Criticisms of GETS modelling are 
commonly concerned with the problems of controlling the overall size of tests in a sequential 
testing process and of interpreting the final results from a classical viewpoint (Owen, 2003). 
Hence, the joint application of BMA and GETS model selection procedures in this paper is 
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designed to combine the strengths of both methods and to circumvent the limitations of each 
to some extent (see Appendix B for brief discussion of the two methods).  
Since neither method can handle the problem of endogenous regressors during the 
model selection process, no causal interpretation can be attached to the results at this stage. 
We therefore adopt a two-stage testing approach to solve this problem. When a subset of 
variables are identified as receiving the greatest support from the underlying data according 
to the model selection results, a further panel data analysis is conducted to investigate the 
deeper determinants of provincial GDP per capita growth in China. Although cross-sectional 
regression has the advantage of focusing on the long-run trends of economic growth, panel 
data methods can control for omitted variables that are persistent over time, and can alleviate 
measurement error and endogeneity biases by use of lags of the regressors as instruments 
(Temple, 1999).   
The panel data estimation approach 
It is a challenge to estimate a short dynamic panel with fixed effects and multiple endogenous 
regressors, especially when the number of cross sections is relatively small. Several 
econometric problems require attention. For instance, the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the time-invariant region-specific effects renders the OLS estimator 
biased and inconsistent (Hsiao, 1986). In the cross-country or cross-province growth 
regressions, the OLS estimate of the coefficient of initial income term is likely to be biased 
upward (Bond et al., 2001; Hoeffler, 2002). Nickell (1981) showed that the within-groups 
estimator will be biased for fixed T and large N. Although the bias diminishes with T, for the 
typical growth regression with small T, the within-groups estimate of the coefficient of the 
initial income term is likely to be seriously biased downwards. This problem also applies to 
the instrumental variable methods based on fixed effects. 
The system GMM estimator for dynamic panels has become popular in the empirical 
growth literature so as to overcome the Nickell (1981) bias and to address the problems of 
endogeneity and mismeasurement. It combines the standard set of equations in first-
differences with suitably lagged levels as instruments, with an additional set of equations in 
levels with suitably lagged first-differences as instruments. By adding the original equation in 
levels to the system and exploiting these additional moment conditions, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) found a dramatic improvement in efficiency and a 
significant reduction in finite sample bias compared with first-differenced GMM. However, 
caution is needed in at least two aspects in applying system GMM to our study. First, the 
instrument proliferation problem is likely to be severe when the cross-section dimension is 
small. According to Bowsher (2002) and Roodman (2009), as   rises, the instrument count 
can easily grow large relative to the sample size, making some asymptotic results about the 
estimators and related specification tests misleading. Second, the problem of cross-sectional 
error dependence can lead to serious problems in the estimation of short dynamic panels. 
Sarafidis and Robertson (2009) demonstrate that under cross-sectional error dependence, the 
GMM estimator is inconsistent as      for fixed  , which holds for any lag length of the 
instruments used.   
To address the instrument proliferation problem, we adopt two approaches to restrict 
the number of instruments used in our system GMM estimation. The first is to collapse the 
instrument sets, i.e. the GMM estimator is based on one instrument per variable instead of 
one instrument for each variable at each period. The second approach is to use only certain 
lags instead of all possible lag lengths for instruments in each first-differenced equation. For 
example, for potentially endogenous variables, levels of that variable lagged by 10-year, 15-
year and 20-year periods are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and first-
differenced variables lagged by a 5-year period are used as additional instruments for the 
levels equations. Following the suggestion of Roodman (2009), we report the number of 
instruments generated for our regressions together with the Hansen and Difference Sargan 
statistics. Regarding the second problem, we include time-specific effects in our regressions 
to capture common variations in the dependent variable and to reduce the asymptotic bias of 
the estimator in the presence of cross-sectional error dependence. Besides, all the standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on province.   
4. Empirical results 
The dataset 
The original sample consists of a panel of 30 provinces with annual data for the period 1978-
2007
4
. The data come mainly from China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004 compiled by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The data for 2005-07 are obtained from the latest 
issues of China Statistical Yearbook. The reliability of Chinese official macroeconomic data 
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1997-2007, so making it consistent with earlier observations.
 
is often under dispute. One important issue is the problem of data inconsistency over the 
sample period. For example, GDP figures for the years 2005-07 were recompiled on the basis 
of China's 2004 Economic Census, while corresponding provincial data for earlier years 
remain unrevised. Another problem is data non-comparability across provinces. Take 
population as an example: the household registration population figure is provided for some 
provinces, whereas for others only permanent population data are available. In addition, the 
substantial 'floating population' of temporary migrants is not fully accounted for by the 
population data. These discrepancies can result in measurement error problems and may call 
into question the reliability of our estimation results. Therefore, on the one hand, we use a 
number of 'cleaning rules' (see Appendix A) to get rid of potential outliers for each variable 
and, on the other hand, we employ the panel data System GMM estimator to deal with 
potential mismeasurement.           
Our first-stage model selection analysis is based on cross-sectional data, in which 
observations are averaged over the entire sample period. For the subsequent panel-data study, 
we opt for non-overlapping five-year time intervals, which have been widely used in the 
cross-country growth literature (for instance, Islam, 1995; Bond et al., 2001; Ding and 
Knight, 2009). On the one hand, by comparison with the yearly data, the five-year average 
setup alleviates the influence of temporary factors associated with business cycles. On the 
other hand, we are able to maintain more time series variation than would be possible with a 
longer-period interval.  
All the variables are calculated in 1990 constant prices and price indices are province- 
specific
5
. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics of provincial growth rates of real GDP per capita. The annual average 
per capita growth rate of all 30 provinces over the entire reform period was 7.7%, with an 
average value of 8.1% for the coastal provinces and 7.5% for interior provinces. China's 
economic reform generated across-the-nation rapid growth, i.e. both the coastal and inner 
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 The deflator is the provincial consumer price index (CPI). Assessing China’s GDP growth rates relies on 
reliable GDP deflator data. However, it is widely believed that China’s implicit GDP deflator based on the 
Material Product System approach has understated inflation in China, therefore exaggerating the real GDP 
growth (Wu, 1997; Maddison, 1998; Woo, 1998; Rawski, 2001). Using a different approach, Maddison (1998) 
predicts that the average annual real GDP growth rate for China is 2.4 percentage points below the official one. 
His GDP figure of China has been accepted internationally by the Penn World Tables and the World Bank. 
However, that figure is an aggregate one for China as a whole rather than province-specific. According to Wu 
(1997) and Holz (2006), a simple and possibly relatively acceptable approach to deriving China’s real GDP 
growth rate is to use China’s official CPI as a single deflator. They both show that the use of price indices 
instead of the official implicit deflators gives a figure of China’s real growth rate similar to Maddison’s. For this 
reason, we deflate the nominal GDP and other variables for each province by province-specific CPI. There are 
no provincial price data for Tibet for the period 1978-89; we use the national aggregate price index to substitute.  
regions grew fast by international standards. However, that a growth disparity did exist is 
indicated by the 4% average growth difference between the highest growth province 
(Zhejiang) and lowest one (Gansu) over the full sample period. Table 1 also reveals 
interesting time patterns in China's growth. Rapid growth occurred in the first decade, slowed 
down in the second decade, and accelerated in the third decade. In the period 1998-2007, the 
growth disparity across provinces became smaller and even the lowest-growing province 
(Yunnan) managed an average rate of 8.2%.  
The explanatory variables can be broadly classified into ten categories: initial level of 
income, physical capital formation, human capital formation, population growth rate, degree 
of openness, pace of economic reform or institutional change, sectoral change or degree of 
industrialization, infrastructure, financial development, and geographic location. A 
geographical distinction is made between ‘coastal’ and other provinces. This classification 
follows that of the literature, the underlying rationale being that the provinces deemed to be 
coastal have advantages in the form of lower-cost access to markets (see Appendix A for 
detailed definitions). 
Baseline equation 
The prospects for selecting a good model depend primarily on the adequacy of the general 
unrestricted model as an approximation to the data generation process (Doornik and Hendry, 
2007). A poorly specified general model stands little chance of leading to a good 'final' 
specific model. We consider ten different groups of explanatory variables, and rely on growth 
theory (although sufficiently loosely) and previous empirical findings to guide the 
specification of the general model. One important issue is that variables within each category 
are highly correlated, which may cause problems if all variables are simultaneously included 
in one general regression. The strategy we adopt is to select one or two representative 
variables from each range (based on existing empirical literature and correlation results) to 
form the basic general model, and then to test for the robustness of the model selection results 
using other variables left in each group. Throughout this section, when we refer to growth we 
shall, unless indicated otherwise, mean average annual growth of real GDP per capita. 
We start from a general model that includes 13 explanatory variables and searches for 
statistically acceptable reductions of this model. The included variables are the logarithm of 
initial level of income (        ),  ratio of fixed capital formation over GDP (       ), 
secondary school enrolment as a proportion of the total population (          ), ratio of 
students enrolled in higher education to students enrolled in regular secondary education 
(                  ), population natural growth rate (       ), ratio of exports to GDP 
(          ), the SOE share of industrial output (               ), change in non-
agricultural share of employment (       ), degree of industrialization (      ),  railway 
density (            ), ratio of business volume of post and telecommunications to GDP 
(              ), and a coastal dummy (           ).  
We first use BMA to isolate variables that have a high posterior probability of 
inclusion. In Table 2, we present a summary of the BMA results, where the posterior 
probability that the variable is included in the model, the posterior mean, and the posterior 
standard deviation for each variable are reported. We are aware of the difficulty of 
interpreting parameters in economic terms when the conditioning variables differ across 
models, so our emphasis here lies on the posterior probability of inclusion for each variable, 
i.e. the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which each variable appears. 
Given that the prior probability of a variable being in the true model is set at 0.5, its 
robustness may be assessed in terms of how the data update this prior. We therefore refer to a 
specific variable as being important if the posterior probability of inclusion is greater than 
0.5. The results indicate a possibly important role for the initial level of income, the SOE 
share of total industrial output, secondary school enrolment, fixed capital formation, and 
population growth.  
We then conduct an automatic model selection exercise using the GETS methodology. 
Starting from the same general model and searching for statistically acceptable reductions, 
the software package Autometrics arrives at a final model with a set of explanatory variables 
broadly similar to those highlighted by the BMA analysis. The OLS estimation of the final 
specific model is reported in Table 3. We find that growth in GDP per capita is negatively 
associated with the initial income level, population growth and the SOE share of industrial 
output, whereas fixed capital investment and secondary school enrolment are positively 
correlated. The major difference between the results of the two methods lies in the role of 
exports in explaining cross-province growth rates, i.e. despite the statistical insignificance, 
exports as a proportion of GDP is retained by GETS in the final specific model, but BMA 
analysis flags the export ratio as potentially unimportant (with a posterior inclusion 
probability of 28%). Other variables such as sectoral change, infrastructure and financial 
development are identified as unimportant predictors of economic growth by both model 
selection methods. However, this outcome may simply reflect the highly endogenous nature 
of these variables, which cannot be accounted for at the model-selection stage. We re-
examine the role of these variables in determining output growth in the panel data context in 
a different paper (Ding and Knight, 2008b).     
Based on the model selection results delivered by BMA and GETS, we now estimate 
the baseline model using various panel data techniques in Table 4. Consistent with the 
prediction of Bond et al. (2001) and Hoeffler (2002), we find that our system GMM estimator 
yields a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the initial level of income which lies in 
between the upper bound provided by the OLS estimator and the lower bound given by the 
within-groups estimator. The instrumental variable method (IV-2SLS) yields an estimate of 
the initial level of income even lower than that of within-groups, indicating the potential bias 
of this kind of fixed-effect estimator in short dynamic panels
6
. Thus, the panel data system 
GMM with a restricted instrument set is our preferred estimation method.  
Interestingly, the GMM results support the model selected by the GETS procedure, i.e. 
the ratio of exports to GDP appears positive and significant. Controlling for other explanatory 
variables, the initial level of income is found to have a negative effect on subsequent 
provincial growth rates, providing evidence of conditional convergence over the reform 
period. The estimated coefficient implies that a one percentage point lower initial level of 
GDP per capita raises the subsequent growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.05 percentage 
points. Conditional convergence is an implication of the neoclassical growth model, deriving 
from the assumption of diminishing returns to capital accumulation. The controls imply that 
the provinces have different steady states, and that convergence will lead them to their 
respective steady state levels of income per capita. Despite the challenge posed by 
endogenous growth theory, the neoclassical paradigm of conditional convergence is widely 
supported by empirical evidence in both the cross-country growth literature (for example, 
MRW, 1992; Islam, 1995; Bond et al., 2001; Ding and Knight, 2009) and cross-province 
growth studies of China (for example, Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Chen and Feng, 2000; Cai et 
al., 2002).  
One possible explanation for conditional convergence is that relatively poor provinces 
have lower stocks of physical and human capital, so that the marginal product of capital is 
higher for them. Another explanation for conditional convergence might lie in the central 
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 Because the Nickell (1981) bias would diminish as T becomes larger, as a robustness check we also implement 
both the within-groups and IV methods using 3-year time intervals. However, no significant improvement of the 
results is found, perhaps because the 3-year averages are too short to eliminate business cycle effects.  
government's regional development policies. During the period 1978-1993, fiscal 
decentralization reform gave provincial governments more discretionary power in tax 
administration and revenue collection. The 'fiscal contracting system' reduced the central 
government's share of revenue and curtailed fiscal transfers away from rich and towards poor 
provinces (Raiser, 1998; Knight and Li, 1999). In 1994, the 'tax assignment system' reform 
strengthened the central government's fiscal capacity, which enabled it to promote economic 
development in poor regions such as the western provinces and minority areas. From about 
1998 onwards there was a fiscal redistribution towards poor provinces (Wong and Bird, 2008: 
456). This might help to explain the convergence between lowest and highest growth 
provinces in recent years (Table 1). 
Fixed capital formation is an important determinant of China's growth: a one 
percentage point rise in the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP in a province raises its 
growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.1 percentage points. Human capital investment appears to 
be even more important, i.e. a one percentage point increase in the secondary school 
enrolment ratio is associated with a higher growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.3 percentage 
points. Since both physical and human capital accumulation are the focus of this paper, 
detailed discussion will follow in the next two subsections.   
The increase in population has a negative consequence for growth: reducing the rate of 
population growth by 0.1 percentage points is associated with an increase in GDP per capita 
growth of 0.4 percentage points. A rapid population growth rate involves a cost, i.e. faster 
growth of the labour force means more capital has to be used to equip the growing labour 
force, and hence there is less scope for capital deepening, with resultant slower growth of 
capital per worker and thus output per worker. Within the standard Solow model, slower 
population growth implies a higher equilibrium level of output per worker and capital per 
worker. This means that if two provinces have the same initial income level, but one has a 
lower population growth rate, it will grow more quickly than the other. China has been keen 
to curb its population growth mainly through the family planning policy, implemented since 
the late 1970s. Despite the controversy over the humanity of the 'one-child family policy', 
such tightened demographic policy has been efficient in slowing down population growth and 
reducing the strain on resources in China, which has a positive impact on its growth of GDP 
per capita. 
Exports are conducive to provincial growth: a one percentage point increase in the ratio 
of exports to GDP leads to an increase in GDP per capita growth of 0.08 percentage points. 
According to the report of the Commission on Growth and Development (2008), a flourishing 
export sector is an important ingredient of high and sustained growth, especially in the early 
stages. In endogenous growth theory, international trade, especially exports, is viewed as an 
important source of human capital augmentation, technological change and knowledge 
spillover across countries (Grossman and Helpman, 1993). China's open-door policy, adopted 
after 1978, created an excellent opportunity to exploit its comparative advantage in labour-
intensive manufacturing industry, making exports a driver of China's growth. 
The SOE share of industrial output has a significant and negative impact on output 
growth: a decrease of one percentage point in the variable raises the GDP per capita growth 
rate by 0.04 percentage points. This variable is a proxy for the pace of economic reform or 
institutional change. In the mid-1980s, SOEs were given successively greater autonomy in 
production and a greater share of the profits they generated through a variety of profit 
remittance contracts and management responsibility systems (Riedel et al., 2007). However, 
owing to the principal-agent problem inherent to state ownership, the effect of the industrial 
reform in improving the efficiency and profitability of SOEs remained limited. By contrast, 
non-state-owned enterprises such as collectively-owned rural township and village 
enterprises in the 1980s and domestic and foreign privately-owned industrial enterprises in 
the 1990s grew rapidly in response to market opportunities and better incentive structures. 
Therefore, the declining share of SOEs in industrial output is conducive to the growth of 
GDP per capita.    
Our system GMM estimation shows that there is no evidence of second order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, and neither the Hansen test nor the Difference 
Sargan test rejects the validity of instruments. In brief, our panel data results favour the 
model selected by the GETS procedure and highlights the role of conditional convergence, 
physical and human capital formation, population growth, degree of openness, and 
institutional change in determining economic growth across Chinese provinces.  
Physical capital accumulation 
It is widely believed that China's exceptional growth performance over the past three decades 
is most fundamentally a reflection of the high investment rates that have characterised the 
economy. As Figure 2 illustrates, real gross capital formation over the entire reform period 
averaged a fairly steady 38.3% of real GDP (       ), which is very high by international 
standards. The rate of gross fixed capital formation (       ) has increased significantly in 
recent years, rising from an average of 29.3% between 1978 and 1993 to an average of 36.6% 
thereafter. Inventory accumulation amounted to, on average, 5.5% of GDP (         ). It 
peaked at the end of 1980s, reflecting the severe economic recession, and declined gradually 
thereafter thanks to the process of marketization. Hence, it is not implausible to hypothesize 
that China's growth success is mainly investment-driven and that a major part of the answer 
to the question 'why does China grow so fast?' is simply 'because it invests so much' 
(Naughton, 2006; Riedel et al., 2007). 
In the cross-country growth literature, there is substantial empirical evidence that 
capital accumulation has a positive and significant effect on growth, for instance Barro 
(1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Bond et al. (forthcoming). 
However, Blomström et al. (1996) argued that fixed investment does not cause economic 
growth: they found that growth induces subsequent capital formation more than capital 
formation induces subsequent growth. In an influential review of the recent empirical 
literature, Easterly and Levine (2001) claimed that 'the data do not provide strong support for 
the contention that factor accumulation ignites faster growth in output per worker'. Given this 
controversy, the issue of causality is crucial in examining the role of capital formation in the 
Chinese context. Controlling for the set of variables selected in the baseline model, we focus 
on the impact of various types of physical capital investment on GDP per capita growth. We 
are particularly interested in the question of what sort of physical capital formation matters 
for China’s growth. Because the association between fixed investment and growth does not 
prove causality, all measures of physical capital formation are treated as endogenous 
variables in our system GMM estimation. To save space, we report only the coefficients of 
interest along with relevant specification tests. 
We first decompose total investment in fixed assets (             ) into investment in 
capital construction (          ), investment in innovation (            ), and investment 
in other fixed assets
7
 (             ) in Panel 1 of Table 5. We find that the former three 
have positive and significant impacts on growth, whereas the last appears insignificant. These 
results highlight the role of investment spending on capital construction and technological 
innovation in promoting growth and imply that fixed investment in other areas such as the 
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 Capital construction investment refers to the new construction projects or extension projects of enterprises and 
other institutions with the purpose of expanding production capacity or improving project efficiency. Innovation 
investment consists of the renewal of fixed assets and technological innovation of the original facilities by 
enterprises and other institutions. Investment in other fixed assets includes investment in real estate 
development, natural resource (oil, coal, ore, etc) maintenance and exploitation, and other construction and 
purchases of fixed assets not listed in capital construction investment and innovation investment.  
real estate sector and natural resource exploitation is not growth-enhancing, possibly because 
the full effects are longer term. Moreover, the growth impact of investment in innovation is 
much greater than that of total investment in fixed assets and that of investment in capital 
construction: a one percentage point rise in the innovation investment ratio is associated with 
0.3 percentage point higher growth rate of GDP per capita. Although, according to Scott 
(1989, 1993), almost every investment is bound up with technological change, our 
'investment in innovation' variable is particularly likely to identify productivity-enhancing 
innovation. Our finding suggests that the contribution which investment can make to 
technological progress is a powerful driver of growth. China began economic reform from a 
position far below the technological frontier. In a transition economy, much investment is 
necessary to maintain the value of the firm in response to a violent process of obsolescence 
created by new products, new production processes, and huge changes in relative prices 
(Riedel et al., 2007). Our results provide evidence that investment and investment-driven 
improvements in technology are important for China's growth. 
 We then classify investment in fixed assets according to ownership: investment 
spending by SOEs (                 ), collectively-owned enterprises (                 ) 
and private enterprises (                  ) in Panel 2 of Table 5. Since these variables may 
contain information similar to our proxy for the extent of economic reform (                , 
the SOE share of industrial output), we drop that term in these regressions. We find that the 
share of investment made by SOEs has a significantly negative effect on growth: reducing the 
SOE share of fixed investment by one percentage point is associated with an increase in GDP 
per capita growth of 0.13 percentage points. This result is consistent with the widespread 
perception that the efficiency of investment in the SOEs is far below that in the non-state 
sector, so that the growth rate of GDP per capita should fall as the SOE share of investment 
increases (for instance, Brandt and Zhu, 2000). Consequently, the recent decline in the SOE 
share of fixed investment is a positive development. The coefficient on the share of 
investment by collective firms appears insignificant. The collective economy consists of both 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) and urban collectives firms. The former are 
generally said to have been dynamic, especially in the 1980s, whereas the latter are run by 
local governments and still suffer from the disincentives associated with soft budget 
constraints and principal-agent problems. Hence, the impact of collective firms on growth is 
ambiguous.  
The share of private-sector investment affects growth positively: a one percentage point 
increase in this variable is associated with an increased growth rate of 0.20 percentage points. 
The expansion of private sector investment has a favourable impact, given the evidence that 
the average return on investment in the private sector is higher than that in the SOEs (Riedel 
et al., 2007, pp. 40-42). Our empirical evidence thus supports the view that the private sector 
is the driving force in the Chinese economy. It is therefore a positive development that the 
centre of gravity of the economy has been shifting from the state to the private sector.  
A caveat is in order: in the late 1990s some SOEs were corporatized, and would have 
been reclassified as private, although the state, being the major shareholder, generally 
retained control. Insofar as the most profitable or promising SOEs were selected for listing, 
the results are likely to exaggerate the incentive effects of different ownership status. A major 
imbalance in the allocation of resources between the public and private sectors remains. For 
example, bank loans constitute a major share of investment financing only for the relatively 
inefficient and unprofitable SOEs, while private firms are discriminated against by the  
formal  financial system and  rely predominantly on their 'own funds' to finance investment 
(Allen et al., 2005; Guariglia et al., 2008). The estimates imply that financial sector reform 
would raise the growth rate further.  
Human capital accumulation 
Human capital accumulation can be treated analogously to physical capital accumulation, and 
can be incorporated accordingly into growth models and their empirical testing (for example, 
MRW, 1992). Whereas in this paper the assumed relationship is between changes in human 
capital and changes in output, it is also possible that the stock of human capital itself 
contributes to economic growth through the generation, absorption and dissemination of 
knowledge. Human capital is assumed to play such a role in some endogenous models. For 
instance, according to Romer (1990), human capital is an input into the research and 
development activity which generates technological progress. However, research based on 
cross-country data has produced surprisingly mixed results on the effect of education on 
economic growth. For example, MRW (1992) found a significantly positive effect on output 
growth of secondary school enrolment as a proportion of working-age population, whereas 
other researchers (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Pritchett, 1999) claimed that output growth 
did not seem to be strongly related to increases in measured educational attainment (changes 
in the average years of schooling), especially in developing countries. We now examine the 
impact of human capital investment on economic growth in China.    
It is difficult to find a variable that adequately represents human capital. In reality, 
investment in human capital can take many forms, including formal and informal education, 
on-the-job training, health improvements and learning-by-doing. In most empirical studies 
human capital is normally proxied by average years of schooling, and increments to human 
capital either by changes in average years of schooling or by educational enrolment rates. 
Thus, the quality of education and other types of human capital investment are largely 
ignored. Given the data availability, we use enrolment at different educational levels to 
measure certain aspects of human capital in China. Although enrolment is normally measured 
as a proportion of the relevant age group, enrolment as a proportion of the total population is 
a better guide to the increase in human capital and its effect on the economic growth of a 
province. School enrolment may conflate human capital stock and accumulation effects and 
can be a poor proxy for either (see, for instance, Gemmell, 1996 and Temple, 1999). 
Nevertheless, we make use of what information is available to us annually at the province 
level.  
In Table 6, our human capital measurements consist of primary school enrolment 
(           ), secondary school enrolment (          ), regular secondary school 
enrolment (              ), higher education enrolment (           ), university and 
college enrolment (               ),  and enrolment in both secondary and higher education 
(               ), each expressed as a proportion of the total population
8
. To deal with the 
possible endogeneity of these variables, levels of human capital investment variables lagged 
by 10-year, 15-year and 20-year periods are used as instruments in the first-differences 
equations, and first-differenced human capital investment variables lagged by a 5-year period 
are used as additional instruments for the levels equations in the system GMM estimation. 
In line with Chen and Feng (2000) in their cross-province study, we find that the 
coefficient of the primary enrolment variable is insignificant in the growth regression. This is 
to be expected because primary education is mandatory and the negative coefficient may 
reflect the falling number of children as a result of the one-child-family policy, introduced in 
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the late 1970s
9
. Consistent with both the cross-country evidence (for instance, Barro, 1991; 
MRW, 1992) and the cross-province evidence (for instance, Chen and Fleisher, 1996; 
Démurger, 2001), we find that the secondary and regular secondary school enrolment 
variables have positive and significant impacts on output growth.  
The higher education enrolment and university and college enrolment proportions have 
bigger positive effects. For instance, a one percentage point rise in the ratio of enrolment in 
higher education to population leads to higher GDP per capita growth by 3.6 percentage 
points, holding other conditions constant. The important contribution to growth made by 
higher education might be explained by the remarkable relative neglect of higher education, 
and consequent scarcity of tertiary graduates, throughout the first two decades of economic 
reform. Higher education enrolment remained below 0.3% of total population until 1998, and 
then shot up to 1.4% in 2006 as a result of a sharp change in higher education policy. Our 
finding is consistent with Chi (2008), who used educational attainment to measure human 
capital and found evidence that tertiary education has a positive and bigger impact on both 
GDP growth and fixed investment than primary and secondary education. He therefore 
argued that China's production function exhibited some degree of capital-skill 
complementarity. Lastly, we examine the impact of students enrolled in both secondary and 
higher education over population, and find that a one percentage point rise in this variable is 
associated with a 2.0 percentage point rise in the growth rate of GDP per capita.  
To test the robustness of our human capital results, census information on the 
percentage of population aged 6 and above with primary, secondary, or tertiary educational 
attainment are adopted. These data are proxies for the stock of human capital but they are 
only available for the census years 1982, 1990, 1995 and 2000. We interpolate the census 
data to derive the observations in the years required by the analysis. For these reasons, 
inaccuracies and measurement errors are to be expected when these alternative human capital 
variables are deployed. Nevertheless, we find that the share of population with junior 
secondary education has a positive and significant effect on provincial growth, and that when 
changes in the shares are included in the growth equation, an increase in the relative stock of 
people with both junior secondary and tertiary education raises growth significantly. These 
results are consistent with our findings based on school enrolment data.          
Illustrative counterfactual predictions 
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 The ratio of primary school enrolment to total population fell from 15% in 1978 to 8% in 2006. 
We return to the underlying question: can cross-province growth regressions help us to 
understand why China as a whole has grown so fast? We attempt to answer the question by 
means of counterfactual predictions in Tables 7 and 8. The methodology is to predict growth 
rates by changing mean values of key variables based on model estimation. Because these 
simulations contain the questionable assumption that a change in one variable would not alter 
the other variables in the equation, they can merely illustrate the rough orders of magnitude 
of the impact on the growth rate. However, insofar as an adverse change in one variable (say, 
human capital formation) induces an adverse change in another variable (say, physical capital 
formation), the simulations would understate the impact on growth.   
The average value of fixed investment in relation to GDP over the full sample period 
was 34.3%. If instead it had been 10 percentage points lower (24.3%), the system GMM 
coefficient of the baseline model in Table 4 implies that China's growth of GDP per capita 
would have fallen by 0.9 percentage points, from 8.0 to 7.1%, holding other variables 
constant. Similarly, secondary school enrolment averaged 5.8% of total population. If it had 
been 2 percentage points lower, controlling for other variables, the growth rate of GDP per 
capita would have declined to 6.0%. Had both the physical and human capital variables been 
reduced in this way, China's per capita growth rate would have fallen to 5.1%, holding other 
controls constant.  
China was a low-income country at the start of economic reform
10
. The mean values of 
the fixed capital formation and secondary school enrolment ratios of all least developed 
countries (United Nations 2008 classification) over the entire period are 17.8% and 2.3% 
respectively
11
. Plugging these values into the baseline model, we find that China's growth rate 
of GDP per capita would have been only 2.9% per annum, to be compared with 1.0% for the 
least developed countries. On these assumptions, China's status as a growth outlier would 
have been much weaker. 
Consider the effects of changes in the composition of physical investment in Table 8. 
The ratio of innovation investment averaged 6.9% of total GDP in China over the whole 
sample period. Our estimated coefficient shows that a reduction in this variable to half of its 
mean would have resulted in a one percentage point lower growth rate of GDP per capita. 
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 The ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP and the total population data for least developed countries come 
from the World Development Indicators (April 2008 edition); secondary school enrolment figures come from 
UNESCO.  
Combining the effect of reducing the secondary school enrolment ratio to half, the growth 
rate would have fallen to 3.4% holding other conditions the same. Private fixed investment 
averaged 16.7% of total GDP in China over the full period. If it had remained at its 1978 
level (5.1%), growth would have been 2 percentage points lower, at 6.1% per annum. 
Combining the effect of reducing secondary school enrolment to half, China's growth rate 
would have been down to 1.2%.  
How important was post-primary education to growth? Secondary and higher education 
enrolments averaged 5.8% and 0.4% of population respectively over the full period. Had both 
the secondary and tertiary ratios been half of their mean values instead, the growth rate would 
have fallen by 5.8 percentage points, to 2.2% per annum.  
The conclusion to be drawn from these simple counterfactual exercises is that both the 
quantity and composition of physical and human capital formation are potentially important 
to China's rate of economic growth. A reduction of these inputs to levels commonly found in 
the countries that, unlike China, remained least developed, could have reduced the growth 
rate to that of those countries. 
5. How was rapid capital accumulation possible? 
In this section we pose the questions that flow logically from our results: how was China’s 
rapid physical, and also human, capital accumulation possible? As each of these questions 
deserves a separate study on its own, we merely provide an outline sketch of the possible 
components of an answer. 
With the physical capital stock being well below its equilibrium level, there were 
powerful profit incentives to invest in many sectors of the economy. However, China's rapid 
capital accumulation would not have been possible without high domestic saving. What made 
such a high national saving rate possible? Households have become a principal source of 
saving since the start of economic reform. Household saving increased from 5% of income in 
1978 to a peak of 34% in 1994, and remained above 24% in 2000 (Modigliani and Cao, 
2004). Over the reform period, China's GDP per capita rose nearly tenfold, from $165 in 
1978 to $1598 in 2007
12
. With higher income, households chose to save a higher proportion 
of their income. Riedel et al. (2007) claimed that a virtuous circle has operated in China, 
whereby higher income leads to more saving, hence permitting more investment and faster 
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growth, which in turn leads to higher income. By contrast, Modigliani and Cao (2004) 
attributed China's high household saving rate to accelerating economic growth and 
demographic change, rather than income per capita. Within the framework of the Life Cycle 
Hypothesis, they argued that household wealth would bear a constant ratio to income, so that 
faster growth would involve a higher saving rate. They also argued that the birth-control 
policy undermined the traditional role of children as old-age support and, in the absence of a 
well-developed social security system, this encouraged households to provide for retirement 
through saving. Another contribution might come from the increasing scope for household 
business and housing investment. Given credit constraints, households responded to the new 
opportunities by saving for investment (Naughton, 2006). 
High enterprise and government saving also contributes to China's high saving rate. On 
the one hand, the imperfect capital market makes firms, especially private firms, rely mainly 
on their own funds (i.e. retained earnings) to finance investment. This provides them with a 
strong incentive to save. On the other hand, the profitability of firms has increased 
significantly since enterprise reform began in earnest in the mid-1990s. Moreover, as the 
government has not sought dividends from SOEs, their rising profits are either reinvested or 
sit in their savings accounts. Government saving has also been high since 1978 as a result of a 
policy favouring government-financed investment over government consumption (Kuijs, 
2005). The Chinese government was willing and able to take a long run view because it 
expected to remain in power for many years, it was not subject to democratic pressures for 
'jam today', and the rapid growth of household incomes provided a shield against social 
discontent. 
Educational enrolment and its growth over time, so important for economic growth, has 
in turn to be explained: both demand and supply factors played a role. In 1988, early in the 
process of urban reform, the wage premium of upper secondary education over primary 
education for urban residents was very low, at 4%, but with labour market reform it rose to 
26% in 1995 and to 33% in 2002. The urban wage premium of higher education over upper 
secondary education rose from only 5% in 1988 to 17% in 1995 and to 42% in 2002 (Knight 
and Song, 2005, table 3.2; Knight and Song, 2008, table 2). Although the returns to education 
remained low in farming, they were higher in the non-farm activities that were opening up to 
rural workers, and education also improved their access to these higher-income activities 
(Knight et al., 2010, tables 2, 5, 6). As opportunities for local non-farm employment and 
rural-urban migrants grew, education became an increasingly important means of raising the 
incomes of rural workers (Knight and Song, 2005, table 8.8). 
These labour market reforms and structural changes raised the private demand for 
education. This demand was in any case strong on account of the respect and status 
commonly accorded to education, which had been embedded by Chinese history. Thus, for 
instance, when a sharp change in higher education policy took place in the late 1990s, the 
remarkable increase in the supply of college places was fully met by the pent-up demand, 
with enrolment rising over four-fold between 1998 and 2005
13
. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have attempted to answer a broad question: why has China grown so fast? 
Despite the diversity in growth among provinces, the economies of all provinces grew rapidly 
by international standards over the period of economic reform. To address the problem of 
model uncertainty, we adopted two recently developed approaches to model selection, BMA 
and GETS, to consider a wide range of candidate predictors of economic growth in China. 
The first-stage model selection results identified a role for conditional convergence, physical 
and human capital formation, population growth, degree of openness, and institutional change 
in determining output growth across China's provinces. Using the basic equation, we 
proceeded to examine the growth impact of physical and human capital investment in some 
detail using panel data system GMM.  
Among results of the baseline model, three major findings form the basis of our story: 
there is conditional convergence among provinces, and both physical and human capital 
accumulation promote economic growth. They are consistent with the implications of the 
transitional dynamics of neoclassical growth theory. Such transitional movement is indeed to 
be expected given the likely disequilibrium of the Chinese economy at the start of economic 
reform. Our evidence of conditional convergence implies that each province is converging 
towards its equilibrium steady state. It might, however, have other explanations, e.g. that 
convergence reflects the effects of fiscal transfers from the central government to poor 
provinces and minority areas. The growth impacts of physical and human capital 
accumulation are in line with the conditional convergence argument. An alternative 
interpretation of the positive effects of investment, drawing on endogenous growth theory, is 
that it has generated not only capital accumulation but also technological progress. 
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Our more detailed investigation of the effects of physical and human capital 
accumulation was intended to throw further light on the mechanisms at work. Among the 
types of fixed investment, the greatest contribution was made by investment identified as 
'investment in innovation' as opposed to 'investment in capital construction', and 'investment 
in other fixed assets', such as real estate, made no contribution. This result suggests that 
physical investment makes the greatest contribution to growth when it is most closely bound 
up with technological progress. Breaking down physical investment by ownership, we found 
that an increased share of SOEs decreases the contribution of investment to growth, an 
increased share of collective enterprises has a negligible effect, and an increased share of 
private enterprises raises the contribution. Thus, the reform process that unleashed a private 
sector was important for growth, and the distorted financial system which continued to favour 
the state-owned enterprises held back growth. 
Whereas primary school enrolment has no effect on economic growth, both secondary 
school and higher education enrolment had a positive effect, the latter more than the former. 
Indeed the coefficient on higher education enrolment in relation to population implied that a 
rise of one percentage point would raise the growth rate of GDP per capita by 2.8 percentage 
points. This sensitivity might be explained by the neglect of higher education until the late 
1990s: in 1997 higher education enrolment was still only 5% of the relevant age group. Our 
use of GMM estimation and instrumenting of the human capital variables using lags provided 
the best means of estimating the causal effect of human capital on growth. 
To address our title question - why has China grown so fast? - it was necessary to 
assume that the growth impact of a variable estimated on the basis of its variation among 
provinces would be a guide to its impact in the economy as a whole. Various counterfactual 
exercises were conducted on that basis. We found that a significant reduction in capital inputs 
could have reduced China's growth rate dramatically, indicating the important role of 
physical and human capital formation in determining China's remarkable rate of economic 
growth. The factors which made rapid physical and human capital accumulation possible 
were discussed briefly. Incentives for saving have been strong for households, enterprises and 
governments over the reform period, and labour market reform, by increasing the wage 
premia on education, has produced rapid growth in the demand for education, to which 
government has responded by increasing the supply.    
In this paper we have used and extended the baseline growth equation to examine the 
contribution that factor accumulation has made to China's economic growth. These are the 
proximate determinants of growth. Underlying them, however, are the other influences on 
growth that enter our baseline equation. These other determinants are explored in a 
companion paper (Ding and Knight, 2008b).  
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Appendix A 
Detailed variable definitions and data cleaning rules (30 Provinces, 1978-2007) 
 
Variable Definition Units 
Dependent variables 
gi,t Growth rate of real provincial GDP per capita  % 
Independent variables 
1. Initial income variable 
lnyi,t-1 Logarithm of beginning-period real GDP per capita 1990 RMB 
2. Physical capital formation 
(1) By national account classification 
gcf_gdp Gross capital formation to GDP % 
fcf_gdp Fixed capital formation to GDP % 
inven_gdp Inventory investment to GDP (inven_gdp = gcf_gdp-fcf_gdp) % 
(2) By usage classification 
finvTOTAL_gdp Total investment in fixed assets to GDP % 
finvCC_gdp Fixed investment in capital construction to GDP % 
finvINNO_gdp Fixed investment in innovation to GDP % 
finvOTHER_gdp Fixed investment in other usage to GDP  
(finvOTHER_gdp = finvTOTAL_gdp-finvCC_gdp- finvINNO_gdp) 
% 
(3) By ownership classification 
finvSOE_finvTOTAL Investment in fixed assets by state-owned units / Total investment in 
fixed assets 
% 
finvCOL_finvTOTAL Investment in fixed assets by collectively-owned units / Total 
investment in fixed assets 
% 
finvPRIV_finvTOTAL Investment in fixed assets by private units / Total investment in fixed 
assets 
% 
3. Human capital formation 
stuPRIM_pop Students Enrolled in Primary Education / Year-end total population % 
stuSEC_pop Students Enrolled in Secondary Education / Year-end total population % 
stuREG_SEC_pop Students Enrolled in Regular Secondary Education / Year-end total 
population 
% 
stuHIGH_pop Students Enrolled in Higher Education / Year-end total population % 
stuUNI&COL_pop Students Enrolled in Universities and Colleges / Year-end total 
population 
% 
stuSEC&HIGH_pop Students Enrolled in both secondary and higher Education / Year-end 
total population 
% 
4. Population growth rate 
pop_ngr Population natural growth rate = Birth rate - death rate % 
pop_gr Annual population growth rate = Log difference of total population % 
5. Degree of openness 
(1) Trade volumes 
trade_gdp Ratio of exports and imports to GDP (Exports and imports converted % 
to RMB using official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
export_gdp Ratio of exports to GDP (Exports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
% 
import_gdp Ratio of imports to GDP (Imports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
% 
(2) Changes of trade volumes 
trade_gr Growth rate of trade volumes (Exports and imports converted to RMB 
using official exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
% 
export_gr Growth rate of exports (Exports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
% 
import_gr Growth rate of imports (Imports converted to RMB using official 
exchange rate from IFS, IMF) 
% 
6. Institutional change 
(1) Of investment 
finvSOE_finvTOTAL Investment in fixed assets by state-owned units / Total investment in 
fixed assets 
% 
finvCOL_finvTOTAL Investment in fixed assets by collectively-owned units / Total 
investment in fixed assets 
% 
finvPRIV_finvTOTAL Investment in fixed assets by private units / Total investment in fixed 
assets 
% 
(2) Of industrial output 
indSOE_indTOTAL Output value of state-owned enterprises  / Gross industrial output value % 
indCOL_indTOTAL Output value of collective enterprises  / Gross industrial output value % 
indPRIV_indTOTAL Output value of private enterprises  / Gross industrial output value % 
(3) Of employment 
wokSOE_wokTOTAL State-owned enterprise workers / Total staff and workers % 
WokCOL_wokTOTAL Collective enterprise workers / Total staff and workers % 
WokPRIV_wokTOTAL Private enterprise workers / Total staff and workers   % 
7. Sectoral change  
(1) Temple and Wöβmann (2006)'s specification 
s Agricultural share of GDP (Primary sector GDP / Total GDP) % 
a Agricultural share of employment (Primary sector employment / Total 
number of employed persons) 
% 
m Non-agricultural share of employment (m=1-a) % 
p Migration propensity (p=-(da/dt)/a)  
MGROWTH Linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share of 
employment (dm/dt) 
% 
DISEQ Non-linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share of 
employment adjusted by migration propensity (p/(1-p)*(dm/dt)) 
% 
MGROWTH2 Linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share of 
employment * Average labour productivity in agricultural sector 
((dm/dt)*s/a) 
% 
DISEQ2 Non-linear sectoral change term: Change of non-agricultural share of 
employment adjusted by migration propensity * Average labour 
productivity in agricultural sector (p/(1-p)*(dm/dt)*s/a) 
% 
(2) Dowrick and Gemmell (1991) or Poirson (2001)'s specification 
MGROWTH*RLP Change in employment share in non-agricultural sector weighted by 
relative labour productivity (RLP = ratio of average labour 
productivity in non-agriculture to that in agriculture) 
% 
(3) Degree of industrialization 
deofin Degree of industrialization (Gross industrial output value / (Gross 
industrial output value + Gross agricultural output value)) 
% 
gr_deofin Growth rate of degree of industrialization  % 
8. Infrastructure 
railway_area Mileages of railways per square kilometre (Total railway length / 
Area) 
% 
highway_area Mileages of highways per square kilometre (Total highways length / 
Area) 
% 
post&tele_gdp Business volume of post and telecommunication  / GDP % 
9. Financial development 
loan_gdp Total bank loan outstanding / GDP % 
saving_gdp Savings deposit in urban and rural areas / GDP % 
10. Geographic location 
dumcoastal A dummy variable which is equal to one for coastal provinces 
(Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan, plus Beijing), and zero otherwise. 
0 or 1 
Note: All the variables are calculated in 1990 constant prices and price indices are province-specific.  
 
Pre-test data cleaning rules 
o Because of the gap between pre- and post-census GDP data, we treat any observation 
of annual growth rate of provincial GDP per capita above - / + 25% as an outlier. As a 
result, 33 observations are removed before the first-stage cross-sectional analysis and 
before calculating the five-year averages for subsequent panel estimation. 
o The population data at the province level are problematic as some provinces report 
household registration population whereas others report permanent population only. 
We therefore treat any observation of annual population growth rate above - / + 8% as 
an outlier. For population natural growth rate (pop_ngr), one observation is removed; 
and for population growth rate (pop_gr), 38 observations are removed.   
o As for the employment data, data before 1998 are the figures of all staff and workers 
for each province whereas after 1998 the figures include on-post staffs and workers 
only. We therefore extrapolate to make the series consistent before and after 1998. 
o Regarding the gross industrial output value, before 1998 the data are for all 
independent account enterprises, whereas after 1998 only enterprises above 
designated size (annual sales income of over 5 million RMB) are covered. We 
therefore extrapolate to make the series consistent before and after 1998.    
o The business volume of post and communication are reported at 1990 constant prices 
during 1978-99 and at 2000 constant prices thereafter. We therefore use our own price 
deflator to transform all values to 1990 constant prices. 
 
 
Appendix B: Model selection procedures  
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) 
The following brief discussion of the theory behind BMA draws heavily on Raftery (1995), 
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) and Malik and Temple (2009).  
A natural way to think about model uncertainty is to admit that we do not know which model 
is 'true' and instead, attach probabilities to different possible models. BMA treats parameters 
and models as random variables and summarizes the uncertainty about the model in terms of 
a probability distribution over the space of all possible models. 
Suppose we want to make inference about an unknown quantity of interest (such as a 
parameter),   , given data  . There are a large number of possible statistical models, 
          for the data space. If we consider only linear regression models but are unsure 
about which   possible regressors to include, there could be as many as    models 
considered. Bayes' rule and basic probability theory suggest that the posterior distribution of 
the parameters is the weighted average of all the possible conditional posterior densities with 
the weights given by the posterior probabilities of each of the possible models. Then the 
posterior distribution of   given data   is 
                                                                        
 
       ,                        (A.1) 
where              is the posterior distribution of   given the model   , and           
is the posterior model probability. Thus the BMA posterior distribution of   is a weighted 
average of the posterior distributions of   under each of the models, weighted by their 
posterior model probabilities.  
Based on Bayes' theorem, the posterior model probability is given by  
                                                       
                 
                  
 
   
       ,                                   (A.2) 
where        is the prior probability of model  , and            is the integrated 
likelihood of model    , obtained by integrating over the unknown parameters 
                                                                                 ,                   (A.3) 
where    is the parameter vector of model   ,                is the likelihood of    under 
model    , and               is the prior distribution over the parameter space associated 
with model    . The integrated likelihood            is a high dimensional integral that 
can be hard to calculate analytically, and therefore some simplification and approximations 
are required. Raftery (1995) proposes that a convenient solution is to approximate twice the 
log Bayes factor using the Bayesian Information Criterion (   ) due to Schwarz (1978). One 
important advantage of the     approximation is that it avoids the need for an explicit 
specification for the prior distributions              . To represent no prior preference for any 
model, each model can be presumed equally likely before examining the data, i.e. all possible 
models have equal prior probabilities or           . Then the posterior model probability 
can be calculated as  
                                                           
             
              
 
   
    .                                    (A.4) 
Then we are ready to implement a systematic form of inference for different parameters of 
interest, which is superior to the ad hoc strategies often used in cross-province growth studies 
of China. One potential difficulty in implementing BMA is the sheer range of possible 
models. To deal with this problem, Occam's Window technique and Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo techniques can be adopted. The former focuses on a subset defined by Occam's 
Window technique and treats all the worst-fitting models outside the subset as having zero 
posterior probability. Embodying the principle of parsimony, this method considerably 
reduces the number of possible models, and in the meantime encompasses the inherent model 
uncertainty present. The latter has the advantage of simultaneously selecting variables and 
identifying outliers, but requires a larger sample size relative to the regressor set. Given our 
small sample size (N=30), we use the package bicreg for S-Plus or R written by Adrian 
Raftery, where the computational procedure for Occam's Window technique is implemented 
to exclude the relatively unlikely models. 
General-to-specific approach (GETS) 
The following brief discussion of general-to-specific methodology draws heavily on Owen 
(2003), Hendry and Krolzig (2004), Hoover and Perez (2004), and Doornik and Hendry 
(2007). 
The general-to-specific model selection is also referred to as the LSE approach to 
econometric modelling. It begins with the idea that the truth can be characterized by a 
sufficiently rich regression (the general regression), i.e. if every possible variable is included 
in the regression, then the general regression must contain all the information about the true 
determinants. However, the model may not be informative, and therefore the information 
content can be sharpened by a more parsimonious regression (the specific regression). The 
specific regression is a valid restriction of the general model if it is statistically well specified 
and it encompasses every other parsimonious regression.   
The specification of the general unrestricted model (GUM) from which reductions commence 
is crucial to the performance of GETS approach, i.e. the specific model will not be able to 
improve on a bad GUM. Economic theory and previous empirical findings can play a central 
role in providing 'prior simplification'. Once a GUM is specified, insignificant variables are 
eliminated to reduce complexity, and diagnostic checks (normality test, heteroscedasticity 
test, F test for parameter constancy and RESET test for function form) on the validity of 
these reductions ensures congruence of the final model. In order to keep all promising 
variables in the final model, we set the target size as huge (level of significance: 0.1).  
The computing software we use to implement GETS modelling is Autometrics (part of Pcgive 
12 in OxMetrics 5, which was released in late 2007). It is an upgraded version of Pcgets, 
taking many features of the earlier implementations, but also differing in several important 
aspects. For example, Autometrics relied much less on presearch as the simulation 
experiments show almost the same operating characteristics with and without presearch; 
Autometrics does not implement the multiple-path search (which is an unstructured way of 
searching the model space), instead, it considers the whole search space from the outset using 
a tree search, discarding parts in a systematic way; while using roughly the same battery of 
diagnostic tests, Autometrics postpones the testing until a candidate terminal model has been 
found, and if necessary, backtracking is used to find a valid model, making the 
implementation faster and resulting in more parsimonious models; and a block-search 
algorithm is used by Autometrics to handle the case of more variables than observations. In 
brief, simulation results show that Autometrics is similar to Pcgets in terms of power, but had 
better size performance in some cases. 
 
  
 TABLE 1 
 Descriptive statistics of provincial GDP per capita growth rates 
 Full-sample period Sub-sample periods 
 1978-2007 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007 
All provinces (30 provinces) 0.077 
(0.037) 
0.072 
(0.027) 
0.054 
(0.031) 
0.106 
(0.032) 
Coastal provinces (11 provinces) 0.081 
(0.033) 
0.078 
(0.027) 
0.061 
(0.030) 
0.119 
(0.028) 
Interior provinces (19 provinces) 0.075 
(0.038) 
0.073 
(0.026) 
0.055 
(0.032) 
0.109 
(0.034) 
Highest growth province 0.103 
(0.024) 
0.112 
(0.001) 
0.108 
(0.046) 
0.131 
(0.055) 
Lowest growth province 0.061 
(0.049) 
0.019 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.082 
(0.040) 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) are provided; coastal provinces consist of 
Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan, plus 
Beijing; and interior provinces include Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and 
Yunnan; for the full-sample period, the highest growth province was Zhejiang, and the lowest growth 
province was Gansu; for the three sub-sample periods, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shaanxi were the highest growth 
provinces respectively, and Shanghai, Tibet, Yunnan were the corresponding lowest growth provinces. 
 
TABLE 2 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) results 
Regressor 
Posterior probability 
of  inclusion 
Posterior  
mean 
Posterior standard 
deviation 
           100.0 0.223 0.036 
          100.0 -0.021 0.005 
                 100.0 -0.064 0.013 
            100.0 0.483 0.135 
         69.2 0.035 0.031 
         59.9 -0.859 0.917 
                    36.3 0.024 0.041 
            27.6 0.007 0.015 
              20.2 -0.020 0.056 
          8.5 -0.001 0.003 
             8.4 0.001 0.002 
         7.7 -0.005 0.136 
                6.9 -0.002 0.025 
        5.6 -0.001 0.004 
Notes: Estimation is based on cross-sectional data; Dependent variable: growth rate of real 
provincial GDP per capita. 
 
TABLE 3 
General-to-Specific (GETS) model selection results 
Regressor Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
t-value t-probability Part.   
          0.249 0.029 8.35 0.000 0.752 
          -0.025 0.004 -5.45 0.000 0.564 
         0.059 0.021 2.86 0.009 0.262 
            0.418 0.122 3.44 0.002 0.339 
         -1.823 0.701 -2.60 0.016 0.227 
            0.025 0.018 1.43 0.167 0.081 
                 -0.055 0.012 -4.31 0.000 0.446 
      
Sigma        0.006                 RSS     0.001    0.845 
F(6,23)       20.97 [0.000]     LogLik   115.804            AIC  -7.197 
 
Normality test 
 
Chi^2(2)  =   1.872  [0.393] 
Testing for heteroscedasticity F(12,10)  =    0.558  [0.832] 
Notes: This is the OLS estimation of final specific model based on cross-sectional data, T=30; 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real provincial GDP per capita; RSS: residual sum of squares; 
F(6,23): joint significance test; LogLik: log-likelihood; and AIC: Akaike's information criterion. 
 
TABLE 4 
Panel data estimation of the selected baseline model 
Regressors OLS Within Groups IV (2SLS) SYS-GMM 
          
-0.035** 
(0.004) 
-0.061** 
(0.012) 
-0.074** 
(0.018) 
-0.046**  
(0.007) 
         
0.074** 
(0.016) 
0.067** 
(0.026) 
0.227** 
(0.100) 
0.093**  
(0.026) 
            
0.463** 
(0.139) 
0.035 
(0.253) 
0.898* 
(0.500) 
1.008** 
(0.284) 
         
-3.095** 
(0.597) 
-3.843** 
(1.162) 
-3.475* 
(2.078) 
-4.057**  
(1.036) 
            
0.027** 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
0.075 
(0.061) 
0.044**  
(0.018) 
                 
-0.052** 
(0.011) 
-0.053** 
(0.025) 
0.017 
(0.084) 
-0.054**  
(0.021) 
     
    0.746 0.784   
                   0.866 
                  0.352 0.665 
                       0.249 
                    150 150 149 150 
Notes: 5-year interval panel data is used for estimation and all time dummies are included 
but not reported to save space; standard errors are in parentheses, which are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustering on province; in both the IV and system GMM 
estimation,          is treated as pre-determined,         is treated as exogenous, and all 
other variables are treated as endogenous; ** and * indicate that the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 5 or 10% significance level respectively. 
  
TABLE 5 
The growth impact of physical capital formation 
Panel 1. Investment in capital construction, in innovation, and in other fixed assets 
 
                                                    
              0.184 ** (0.042) 0.174** (0.047) 0.277** (0.082) 0.077 (0.111) 
                0.636 0.778 0.810 0.911 
                0.108 0.100 0.261 0.167 
                    0.607 0.862 0.367 0.922 
                   26 26 26 26 
                    150 150 150 150 
Panel 2. Total investment in fixed assets: by ownership classification 
                                                        
              -0.129** (0.026) -0.077 (0.111) 0.197** (0.096) 
                0.610 0.919 0.953 
                0.167 0.172 0.193 
                    0.393 0.586 0.791 
                   26 26 26 
                    149 149 149 
    
Notes: panel data system GMM results are reported; standard errors are in parentheses, which are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustering on province; the control variables are those selected by the model 
selection procedures, i.e.         ,           ,        ,            and                , in which 
         is treated as pre-determined,         is treated as exogenous, and all other variables are treated as 
endogenous; time dummies are included; ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 
zero at the 5 or 10% significance level respectively.  
  
 TABLE 6 
The growth impact of human capital formation 
Panel 1. Primary and secondary enrolments 
 
                                      
              -0.611** (0.254) 1.538** (0.326) 2.171** (0.337) 
                0.186 0.523 0.913 
                0.138 0.179 0.203 
                    0.895 0.706 0.905 
                   26 26 26 
                    149 149 149 
Panel 2. Higher education enrolments 
                                             
              3.568** (0.579) 2.201** (0.617) 1.953** (0.285) 
                0.286 0.155 0.803 
                0.232 0.196 0.225 
                    0.514 0.653 0.801 
                   26 26 26 
                    149 147 149 
 
Notes: panel data system GMM results are reported; standard errors are in parentheses, which are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustering on province; the control variables are those selected by the 
model selection procedures, i.e.         ,        ,        ,            and                , in 
which          is treated as pre-determined,         is treated as exogenous, and all other variables are 
treated as endogenous; time dummies are included; ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 or 10% significance level respectively.  
  
 TABLE 7 
Counterfactual predictions of growth rate of GDP per capita (baseline model) 
Predicted growth rates of GDP per 
capita (Unit: pps) 
           
Mean  
(5.79 pp) 
Reduce by 1 
pp  
Reduce by  
2 pps  
Reduce to the mean 
of LDCs (2.26 pps) 
             
Mean (34.27 pps) 8.03 7.02 6.02 4.48 
Reduce by 1 pp  7.94 6.93 5.92 4.39 
Reduce by 5 pps   7.57 6.56 5.55 4.01 
Reduce by 10 pps   7.10 6.10 5.09 3.55 
Reduce to the mean of LDCs (17.76 pps) 6.50 5.49 4.48 2.95 
Notes: pp(s) refers to percentage point(s); LDCs refer to the least developed countries. 
 
TABLE 8 
Counterfactual predictions of growth rate of GDP per capita (other models) 
Predicted growth rates of GDP per capita  
(Unit: pps) 
           
Mean  
(5.79 pps) 
Reduce by  
1 pp 
Reduce by  
2 pps 
Reduce to half 
of the mean 
Innovation investment (Panel 1, Table 5)     
              Mean (6.85 pps) 8.03 6.76 5.50 4.36 
Reduce by 1 pp 7.76 6.49 5.22 4.09 
Reduce by 2 pps 7.48 6.21 4.94 3.81 
Reduce by 3 pps 7.20 5.93 4.66 3.53 
 Reduce to half of the mean 7.08 5.81 4.55 3.41 
     
Private investment (Panel 2, Table 5)     
         
           
Mean (16.7 pps) 8.06 5.30 4.16 3.15 
Reduce by 1 pp 7.85 5.13 4.00 2.98 
Reduce by 3 pps 7.46 4.74 3.60 2.58 
Reduce to half of the mean 6.55 3.83 2.70 1.68 
 Reduce to 1978 Mean (5.06 pps) 6.05 3.34 2.20 1.18 
     
Higher education enrolments (Table 6)*     
             Mean (0.44 pps) 8.06 6.09 4.12 2.96 
Reduce by 0.1 pps 7.74 5.76 3.79 2.63 
Reduce by 0.2 pps 7.41 5.42 3.45 2.30 
Reduce to half of the mean 7.34 5.35 3.38 2.22 
 Reduce by 0.3 pps 7.08 5.09 3.12 1.96 
Notes: pp(s) refers to percentage point(s); * the regression that simultaneously includes both secondary and 
higher education enrolments is estimated but not reported in Table 6 to save space, but the estimated coefficients 
of the two variables are similar to the case when they enter the regression separately.  
 
  
 
        Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (June 2009 edition). 
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